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Rogue Trends in Sovereign Debt: Argentina, 
Vulture Funds, and Pari Passu Under New York 
Law 
 
By Tim R Samples* 
 
Abstract: Coined the “trial of the century” in sovereign debt litigation, NML v. 
Argentina (NML) involves a radical departure from the traditional unenforceability of 
sovereign debt contracts in favor of the opposite extreme: enforcement through potent 
injunctive remedies applicable to third parties.  Problems with the NML precedent 
could extend far beyond Argentina’s immediate situation.  NML is the latest landmark 
in a trend that creates serious uncertainties for sovereign debt markets—a major 
concern for sovereigns, their creditors, and financial institutions around the world.  
This Article argues that NML creates “bad law” by overcompensating for 
unenforceability problems with an ambitious reading of the pari passu clause and 
supercharged injunctive remedies.  As a practical matter, the milk is spilled; “rogue” 
precedent now exists.  But until broader solutions for problems in sovereign debt are 
available, there are compelling grounds for other courts to apply the NML precedent 
as narrowly as possible.  In addition to the extraordinary factual circumstances of 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: SOVEREIGN DEBT’S “TRIAL OF THE 
CENTURY” 
 
Fifty-three trillion dollars and counting reads the Economist’s Global 
Debt Clock, which tracks global public debt.1  Government debt represents 
a hefty portion—roughly a fifth of financial assets worldwide.2  Foreign-
held sovereign debt is worth trillions of dollars and is an increasingly vital 
component of international finance.3  Beyond the trillions of dollars at 
stake, sovereign debt impacts the lives of billions of people with important 
social and economic consequences.4  Sovereign debt holdings also play an 
important stabilizing role in the portfolios of pension funds, central banks, 
and institutional investors around the world.5  Trends in sovereign debt 
have crucial consequences around the world for human welfare, political 
stability, financial systems, and even national security.6   
Unfortunately, sovereign debt defaults are more than hypothetical 
disaster scenarios in waiting; they are already a serious problem.7  Debt 
 
 1 World Debt Comparison: The Global Debt Clock, ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.com/ 
content/global_debt_clock (last visited July 28, 2014). 
 2 See SUSAN LUND ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION: RETREAT OR 
RESET? 14 (2013). 
 3 Emerging market debt held by foreign interests is worth $1 trillion.  See Serkan Arslanalp & 
Takahiro Tsuda, Tracking Global Demand for Emerging Market Sovereign Debt 4 (IMF, Working 
Paper WP/14/39, 2014), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1439.pdf.  
Advanced economy debt held by foreign interests grew from $5 to $14 trillion between 2004 and 2011.  
See Serkan Arslanalp & Takahiro Tsuda, Tracking Global Demand for Advanced Economy Sovereign 
Debt 23 (IMF, Working Paper WP/12/284, 2012), available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ 
ft/wp/2012/wp12284.pdf.  Foreign holders of U.S. sovereign debt account for almost $6 trillion of the $17.6 
trillion total.  See U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., MAJOR FOREIGN HOLDERS OF TREASURY SECURITIES (2014), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/ mfh.txt; U.S. DEP’T. OF 
TREAS., Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It, TREASURYDIRECT, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP 
/debt/current (last updated Jan. 8, 2015). 
 4 See, e.g., Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt, 100 AM. ECON. 
REV. 573, 573–78 (2010), available at http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/center/forms/growth-debt.pdf 
(explaining frictions between growth rates and rising sovereign debt); see also Manmohoan S. Kumar & 
Jaejoon Woo, Public Debt and Growth 27 (IMF, Working Paper WP/10/174, 2010), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10174.pdf (projecting that U.S. debt will cost 
Americans $2.4 trillion in lost growth over the next five years). 
 5 See PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT INITIATIVE, SOVEREIGN BONDS: SPOTLIGHT ON 
ESG RISKS 4 (2013), available at http://www.unpri.org/publications/. 
 6 See generally Francis E. Warnock, How Dangerous Is U.S. Government Debt?, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 2010), http://www.cfr.org/financial-crises/dangerous-us-government-
debt/p22408.  See also Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Responsible Sovereign Lending and 
Borrowing, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 64, 69–70 (2010) (addressing social costs and 
intergenerational tensions in sovereign debt). 
 7 Between 1950 and 2010, there were 600 sovereign debt restructurings in ninety-five countries, 
sometimes with disastrous economic and social consequences.  See Udaibir S. Das et al., Sovereign Debt 
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defaults tend to plague middle income and highly indebted poor countries 
(HIPCs).8  However, debt crises in the eurozone show that this vulnerability 
extends beyond emerging markets.9  Recent events in the United States 
even illustrated the potential for politically manufactured sovereign 
defaults.10  Increasingly in question is the common assumption that 
advanced economies are completely different than emerging markets in 
terms of available policy solutions in managing unsustainable debt 
burdens.11   
Sometimes likened to a Greek tragedy, Argentina’s troubled history 
with sovereign debt goes back centuries.12  The latest chapter began in late 
2001 when Argentina suspended payments on roughly $100 billion in 
sovereign bonds—the largest sovereign debt default in world history.13  
After contentious restructuring negotiations, Argentina eventually 
exchanged most of its defaulted bonds for new debt, but not before a 
significant number of bonds were acquired by distressed-debt hedge funds, 
often referred to as “vulture” funds, which specialize in acquiring cheap, 
distressed debt and subsequently litigating for a profit.14   
In 2012, a lawsuit led by vulture hedge funds resulted in the Southern 
District of New York’s groundbreaking decision in NML Capital, Ltd. v. 
Republic of Argentina (NML).15  Plaintiffs successfully sued Argentina for 
 
Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 5–6 (IMF, Working Paper 
WP/12/203, 2012), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/ecosoc/debt/2013/IMF_wp12_203.pdf. 
 8 See Julian Schumacher et al., Sovereign Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation 1976-
2010 12 (Feb. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.scu.edu/business/ 
economics/upload/SovereignDefaultsinCourt.pdf; see also IMF & INT’L DEV. ASSOC., HEAVILY 
INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) INITIATIVE — PERSPECTIVES ON THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK AND 
OPTIONS FOR CHANGE (Apr. 2, 1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/ 
options/options.pdf (providing background on the HIPC Initiative, which was launched in 1996). 
 9 For extensive coverage of the eurozone crisis, see The Euro Zone: That Sinking Feeling (Again), 
ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 2014, at 10. 
 10  See Nicole Hong, U.S. Debt Rating Put on Watch by Fitch, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2013, 8:08 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304330904579137851778625112?mod=_ 
newsreel_3. 
 11  See, e.g., Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises: Some 
Lessons Learned and Those Forgotten (IMF, Working Paper WP/13/266, 2013), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13266.pdf.   
 12  See Bob Van Voris, Argentina ‘Greek Tragedy’ Nears End as Debt Ruling Looms, BLOOMBERG 
(Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-31/argentina-greek-tragedy-nears-end-as-debt 
-ruling-looms. 
 13  See J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41029, ARGENTINA , CONG. RESEARCH SERV.13-
03-31 5 (2013). 
 14  See id. (“A diverse group of ‘holdouts’ representing $18.6 billion did not tender their bonds and 
some have opted to litigate instead.”).  For the sake of brevity, distressed debt hedge funds are at times 
referred to as “vulture” funds in this Article.   
 15  See Sovereign Debt: Hold-outs Upheld, ECONOMIST, Nov. 3, 2012, at 74–75, available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21565635-court-ruling-against-argentina-has-
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the breach of a pari passu or “equal footing” covenant,16 obtaining potent 
injunctive remedies to enforce the judgment against Argentina and sending 
shockwaves through sovereign debt markets.17  Plaintiffs won again, 
decisively, in a Second Circuit appeal.18  The Supreme Court then denied 
Argentina’s petition for review of the Second Circuit’s interpretation of 
Argentina’s pari passu obligations.19 
NML creates uncertainties for sovereign debt markets with problematic 
consequences for sovereign borrowers, their creditors, and third parties 
involved in international financial services.20  Exchange bondholders have 
been caught in the crossfire as well.21  NML’s radical solution to 
unenforceability problems could complicate sovereign debt restructuring.22  
Also, New York is a critical jurisdiction, not just for sovereign debt but also 
for corporate debt issuances.23  Thus, for good reason, the Financial Times 
suggests that NML is the “the trial of the century” in sovereign debt 
litigation.24 
Scholars and practitioners alike have analyzed the recent evolution of 
sovereign debt law, which has undergone important changes in the last few 
 
implications-other-governments-hold-outs. 
     16 Though the Latin phrase pari passu literally means “in equal step,” its legal meaning in sovereign 
debt contracts is the subject of considerable debate.  Most pari passu clauses provide that a debtor will 
maintain equal footing among obligations.  See infra notes 201–11 and accompanying text. 
     17 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978, 2012 WL 5895784 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
21, 2012), appeal dismissed, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013) (granting specific performance and permanent 
injunctions).  See Sujata Rao, Investment Focus – Argentine Case Adds to Sovereign Debt Doubts, 
REUTERS (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/23/investment-focus-idUSL5E8 
MN83Y20121123. 
 18  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 19  See Camila Russo & Katia Porzecanski, Argentine Bonds Plunge After U.S. Court Rejects Apeeal 
[sic], BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-16/argentine-bonds-
plunge-after-u-s-supreme-court-rejects-appeal.html. 
 20  See Brief of the American Bankers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Nonparty, the Bank of 
New York Mellon at 14–15, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-cv(L) (2d Cir. 
Jan. 4, 2013); see also Brief for Amicus Curiae the Clearing House Ass’n L.L.C. in Support of Reversal 
at 25–27, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-cv(L) (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2013). 
 21  Exchange bondholders participated in the restructuring of Argentina’s sovereign debt, taking a loss and 
exchanging their bonds for new ones rather than holding out and litigating.  See Vivianne Rodrigues & John 
Paul Rathbone, Argentina Bond Investors Challenge Long Arm of US Law, FIN. TIMES (July 3, 2014, 5:47 
PM), www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/471b5be2-02c7-11e4-a68d-00144feab7de.html. 
 22  Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Republic of 
Argentina’s Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 3, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of 
Argentina, No. 12-105-cv(L), 2012 WL 6777132, at *3 (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2012); Brief for the United 
States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal at 17–18, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic 
of Argentina, No. 12-105-cv(L) (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2012). 
 23  See Das et al., supra note 7, at 41 (illustrating that New York law governs $272 billion out of a 
total of $411 billion in emerging market sovereign bonds, representing 435 issuances out of a total of 
631 issuances). 
 24  Joseph Cotterill, Pari Passu Saga, FIN. TIMES ALPHAVILLE BLOG, http://ftalphaville.ft.com/tag/ 
pari-passu-saga/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
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decades.25  For example, quantitative studies have measured the rise in 
sovereign debt litigation.26  A wide range of economic issues in sovereign 
debt have been explored over the last several decades.27  Existing literature 
has documented the history and debate on the meaning of pari passu—the 
covenant at the heart of the most recent and disruptive wave of sovereign 
debt litigation.28  This Article builds on existing literature by analyzing 
NML within the context of “rogue” trends in sovereign debt and developing 
practical arguments to support a narrow application of NML.29   
“Bad facts make bad law,” goes the old common law axiom.  NML 
brings that cliché to life.  Faced with bad facts, the NML court made bad 
law to punish an uncooperative sovereign defendant.  In doing so, the court 
resorted to drastic measures, relying on enforcement against innocent third 
parties through injunctive remedies.  As a result, NML creates major 
uncertainties for sovereign debt markets.  Unfortunately, NML is unlikely to 
remain an isolated occurrence.  Faced with unenforceability and essentially 
rendered powerless to compel payment by unwilling sovereign defendants, 
other courts have succumbed—as future courts likely will—to the 
temptation of injunctive remedies.   
There are compelling grounds for a narrow approach regarding NML’s 
precedential value.  Not only is NML an unsuitable point of departure with 
exceptional factual circumstances, the Second Circuit opinion explicitly 
provides textual grounds for distinguishing NML from future cases.  NML is 
a true factual outlier.  Although the Second Circuit partially recognized 
Argentina as a “uniquely recalcitrant” debtor, NML represents the most 
exceptional sovereign debt situation in modern history.30  Until broader 
 
 25  See Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 
EMORY L.J. 869, 877–91 (2004) (detailing the emergence and proliferation of pari passu litigation in 
sovereign debt); see also Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Understanding the Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign 
Debt Instruments: A Complex Quest, 43 INT’L LAW 1217 (2009) [hereinafter Olivares-Caminal, Quest]; 
Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, To Rank Pari Passu or Not to Rank Pari Passu: That Is the Question in 
Sovereign Bonds After the Latest Episode of the Argentine Saga, 15 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 745 (2009) 
[hereinafter Olivares-Caminal, Rank]. 
 26  See, e.g., Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 11. 
 27  For a review of recent economic literature on sovereign debt, see Ugo Panizza et al., The Economics and 
Law of Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 651, 659–64 (2009).  For interpretations of 
empirical data on sovereign debt and sovereign defaults, see id. at 664–93. 
 28  See G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. LAW. 635, 650 (2001) (making 
the case against the ratable payment approach to pari passu); FIN. MKTS. L. COMM., ANALYSIS OF THE 
ROLE, USE AND MEANING OF PARI PASSU CLAUSES IN SOVEREIGN DEBT OBLIGATIONS AS A MATTER OF 
ENGLISH LAW 17, n.31 (2005) [hereinafter FMLC STUDY], available at http://www.fmlc.org/uploads/ 
2/6/5/8/26584807/79.pdf (clarifying that the meaning of pari passu under English law does not support 
the ratable payment approach). 
 29  See Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina’s 
Default, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 311, 316–17 (2005).  
 30  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 247 (2d. Cir. 2013). 
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solutions are implemented, a narrow application of NML is the most 
desirable of available options to mitigate the consequences of a rogue trend 
in sovereign debt litigation.  In supporting this position, this Article 
underscores the hazards of perfect storms in sovereign debt—where rogue 
creditors, rogue debtors, and rogue court decisions converge to create 
undesirable and destabilizing precedent in a crucial area of the law.   
This Article is organized as follows:  Part II provides background on 
the law of sovereign debt, restructuring practices, and the current 
environment for sovereign debt litigation.  Part III sets forth the exceptional 
nature of Argentina’s situation across the various stages of sovereign debt.  
Part IV analyzes Argentina’s pari passu clause and the NML decision. 
Building on language from the Second Circuit’s opinion, Part V justifies a 
narrow reading and limited application of NML to future sovereign debt 
cases.   
 
II.  THE EVOLVING LAW OF SOVEREIGN DEBT 
 
For good reason, sovereign debt is often characterized as 
unenforceable.31  Courts generally lack effective enforcement and collection 
mechanisms required to hold accountable unwilling sovereigns.32  In 
nonsovereign, “normal” situations, the remedy for a failure to repay debt is 
typically a money judgment enforceable with asset seizures.  In sovereign 
debt, assets are often beyond the reach of creditors because collection is 
complicated if not impossible.33  Sovereigns usually have few, if any, 
commercial assets outside of their own borders for creditors to attach.34  
Moreover, military options available in extraordinary situations during the 
era of “gunboat diplomacy” are no longer available to powerful creditor 
nations.35   
 
 31  See Anna Gelpern, Contract Hope and Sovereign Redemption, 8 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 132, 132 (2013) 
[hereinafter Gelpern, Contract Hope] (“Sovereign debt is unenforceable.”). 
 32  See EDWIN BORCHARD, 1 STATE INSOLVENCY AND FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS 122 (1951); see also 
Gelpern, Contract Hope, supra note 31, at 133. 
 33  See Olivares-Caminal, Quest, supra note 25, at 1220; see also Gelpern, Contract Hope, supra 
note 31. 
 34  Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation: 
Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 59 (2010); see also 
William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 1 passim (2004) (describing challenges associated with enforcing claims against 
sovereign debtors). 
 35  Historically, creditors could turn to their home governments to intervene on their behalf in such 
disputes.  Many such requests were made in vain, but several instances of dramatic military 
interventions exemplify the era of gunboat diplomacy: 1880–1913.  Compare MICHAEL TOMZ, 
REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: SOVEREIGN DEBT ACROSS THREE CENTURIES 
(Princeton Univ. Press 2007), with Kris J. Mitchener & Marc D. Weidenmier, Supersanctions and 
Sovereign Debt Repayment, 29 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 19 (2010). 
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This Part provides background information on the law of sovereign 
debt, restructuring practices, and the current environment for sovereign debt 
litigation.  First, this Part briefly explains increasing pressures on the 
unenforceability of sovereign debt contracts.  Second, this Part assesses the 
current environment of sovereign debt litigation and the role of distressed 
debt hedge funds in recent legal developments.  Third, this Part addresses 
the legal nature of sovereign debt restructuring in the absence of sovereign 
insolvency mechanisms. 
 
A. Unenforceability Under Fire 
 
Following the Latin American debt crises in the 1980s, sovereign debt 
markets underwent an important shift under the Brady Plan from syndicated 
lending to bond financing.36  During the syndicated lending era, sovereigns 
typically borrowed from commercial banks under a single loan agreement.37  
Under the Brady Plan, existing loan obligations were securitized and 
converted into bonds.  As a result, sovereign creditors became far more 
numerous and atomized.  A secondary market for sovereign debt 
instruments thus emerged.  However, atomization also created new 
complexities and exacerbated collective action problems, all of which 
further complicated orderly debt restructuring.38  While commercial banks 
proved willing participants in voluntary debt restructuring efforts, atomized 
bondholders with divergent interests have proven more difficult.  Recent 
years have seen increasing creditor litigation against sovereigns while the 
identity of plaintiffs has shifted from large banks to distressed debt hedge 
funds, which account for 90% of such lawsuits since 2000.39  Also on the 
rise is the percentage of sovereign defaults that trigger lawsuits, which has 
doubled in recent years.40   
Unenforceability has shown some signs of erosion beginning in the 
1970s.  First, the scope of sovereign immunity was trimmed with the U.S. 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976 and the U.K. State 
Immunities Act of 1978.41  Next, a series of judicial decisions disposed of 
 
 36  Under the Brady Plan, named after U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, bank loans to 
sovereigns were converted into dollar-denominated sovereign bonds.  See Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph 
Reisner, The Effect of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process on Inter-Creditor Relationships, 1988 
U. ILL. L. REV. 493, 500 (1988). 
 37  Id. 
 38  Bratton & Gulati, supra note 34, at 20–22.  
 39  Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 3. 
 40  Id. at 2 (“The likelihood that a debt crisis is accompanied by creditor litigation has more than 
doubled over the past decade, to more than 40% in recent years.”).  For details on the complexity of the 
Argentine default, see infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 41  The FSIA codified several exceptions to sovereign immunity, including commercial activities.  
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key state defenses—including act of state,42 international comity,43 and 
champerty44—opening new doors for litigious holdout creditors.  Finally, as 
explained further below, the pari passu era gained momentum in the 1990s 
with groundbreaking litigation in New York and Belgium.45   
The demise of the comity defense and act of the state defense came in 
1985 with Allied v. Costa Rica.46  Meanwhile, sovereign borrowing came to 
be considered a “commercial activity” in 1992—thus lacking immunity 
under the FSIA—with the Supreme Court decision in Republic of Argentina 
v. Weltover.47  The champerty defense was weakened in 1995 by CIBC v. 
Brazil48 before legislation effectively eliminated it under New York law.49  
Gradually, as classic defenses and immunity from lawsuits eroded, 
attachment of assets became the main obstacle to collecting against 
sovereigns.50  For this reason, asset hunting is increasingly crucial in 
modern sovereign debt disputes.51   
 
 
See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (1976) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  Two years later, the United Kingdom passed similar legislation.  See 
State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, §§ 1–23 (Eng.). 
 42  See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 43  See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 44  See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 45  See Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacila, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999); Elliott Assocs., L.P. 
v. Banco de la Nacila, 194 F.R.D. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 12 F. 
Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 961 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997); Elliott Assocs. L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 948 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  See generally 
William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereign’s Rational Choices, 53 EMORY L.J. 823 
(2004); Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu Interpretation in the Elliott Case: A Brilliant 
Strategy but an Awful (Mid-Long Term) Outcome?, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 39 (2011) (discussing the 
Elliott Assocs. decisions). 
 46  See Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Crédito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), 
aff’d, No. 83-7714, slip op. (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 1984) (per curiam), rev’d, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).  
For an in-depth discussion of the comity defense in sovereign debt litigation, see Stephen Bainbridge, 
Comity and Sovereign Debt Litigation: A Bankruptcy Analogy, 10 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 1 (1986). 
 47  Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614–16 (1992) (concluding that issuing 
bonds is a "commercial activity" similar in nature to a private party’s issuance of commercial bonds).  
For further discussion of the scope of the commercial activity exception under FSIA, see William R. 
Dorsey, III, Reflections on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act After Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. & 
COM. 257, 263–66 (1997). 
 48  See CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) v. Banco Cent. do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105, 1110–11 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 49  Champerty is a common law doctrine that precludes recovery when debt is purchased with the 
sole intent and purpose to litigate on it.  Passed in 2004, Judiciary Law 489 eliminated champerty for 
debts worth more than $500,000.  For a discussion of the decline of the champerty defense in sovereign 
debt litigation, see Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 34, at 52. 
 50  See Olivares-Caminal, Quest, supra note 25, at 1220; see also Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 
8 (describing the current environment for sovereign debt litigation as a “hunt for assets”). 
 51  See infra Part II.B.   
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More recently, holdout creditors have succeeded in suing states for 
breaches of the pari passu clause.52  A landmark case for the current era of 
pari passu litigation is Elliott v. Peru, in which Elliott Associates, L.P. 
(Elliott Associates) convinced a Belgian appeals court to enforce a 
sovereign debt judgment with injunctive remedies applicable to third-party 
financial entities.53  In doing so, the Belgian court embraced a ratable 
payment interpretation of pari passu advocated in a declaration by 
Professor Andreas Lowenfeld.54  This approach to pari passu requires a 
sovereign to pay holdouts and exchange bondholders alike.  Relying on the 
ratable interpretation, the court crafted injunctions prohibiting financial 
institutions from processing payments from Peru to exchange bondholders.  
In doing so, the Belgian court denied Peru’s ability to prioritize payments 
among creditors—an established privilege of sovereign borrowers for the 
better part of a century.55  In effect, this approach forced Peru to decide 
between defaulting on the exchanged bonds and paying the holdouts.  
Facing these scenarios, Peru opted to settle with Elliott Associates for $58.4 
million, a 400% gain on the purchase value of the defaulted bonds for the 
hedge fund.56   
Importantly, the ratable approach in pari passu litigation allows 
holdouts to interfere with a sovereign’s cross-border payments to other 
creditors—namely exchange bondholders who participated in debt 
restructuring—rather than engaging in the difficult game of attaching the 
sovereign’s assets.  Finding a court willing to adopt this radical approach 
may be challenging, but the ratable interpretation of pari passu combined 
with injunctive relief alleviates the classic attachment problem for 
collecting against sovereigns.  But this approach also has high collateral 
costs, often at the expense of innocent third parties like exchange creditors 
and financial institutions.57  Importantly, this approach weakens creditor 
 
 52  For detailed chronology and critiques of the pari passu trend in sovereign debt litigation, see Buchheit & 
Pam, supra note 25, at 877–91.  See also Olivares-Caminal, Quest, supra note 25, at 1228–34. 
 53  The remedies involved restraining orders against financial parties involved in payment processing 
from Peru to exchange bondholders Chase Manhattan Bank, Euroclear System, and Depository Trust 
Company.  See Cours d’Appel [CA] [Courts of Appeal] Brussels, 8e ch. Sept. 26, 2000, General Docket 
No. 2000/QR/92 (Belg.).  See generally Bratton, supra note 45; Olivares-Caminal, supra note 45. 
 54  The ratable payment interpretation of pari passu extends equal footing obligations to actual 
payments, as opposed to rank, and provides grounds for the injunctive relief seen in Elliott and NML.  
For an extensive review of Elliott and the Lowenfeld Declaration, see Buchheit & Pam, supra note 25, 
at 877–80 (citing Declaration of Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld Dated August 31, 2000, at 11–12).  
 55  See BORCHARD, supra note 32; see also Buchheit & Pam, supra note 25, at 898 n.64; Bratton, 
supra note 45, at 844–46 (explaining priority of payment as an established choice for sovereigns). 
 56  See Olivares-Caminal, Quest, supra note 28, at 1225 n.60 (citing John Nolan, Special Policy 
Report 3: Emerging Market Debt & Vulture Hedge Funds: Free-Ridership, Legal & Market Remedies, 
FIN. POLICY FORUM: DERIVATIVES STUDY CTR. (Sept. 29, 2001), http://www.financialpolicy.org/ 
DSCNolan.htm; Gulati & Klee, supra note 28). 
 57  See Joint Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees NML Capital, Ltd. et al. at 39, NML Capital, 
_JD_Samples Final Read_1.24.15.docx (DO NOT  DELETE) 3/12/15  7:53 AM 
Rogue Trends in Sovereign Debt 
35:49 (2014) 
59 
incentives to participate in sovereign restructurings.  Accordingly, the 
Elliott decision had its share of critics, many of them prominent voices in 
sovereign debt.58  
 
B. Needles in Haystacks: The Hunt for Sovereign Assets 
 
Most of the legal innovation in sovereign debt litigation stems from 
cases brought by distressed debt hedge funds, also known as “vulture” 
funds.59  These funds specialize in acquiring distressed sovereign debt at 
deep discounts before attempting to recover a profit through more favorable 
swaps or litigation.60  Like the role of the vulture in a real ecosystem, 
vulture funds play a somewhat underappreciated role in financial markets, 
providing scarce liquidity to bondholders seeking an exit in distressed 
times.61  Fairness and ethics aside, vulturing is also a legal activity.  In fact, 
the business of vulturing is fundamentally legal in nature—dependent 
almost entirely on the judicial enforcement of contractual rights.62  
But these hedge funds have their share of critics, ranging from United 
Nations officials and IMF economists to religious charities.63  Many dismiss 
 
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-0105-cv(L) (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 2013); Brief for Non-Party 
Appellants Exchange Bondholder Group at 2, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-0105-
cv(L) (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (arguing against NML injunctions that would infringe on property rights of 
exchange bondholders); see also Brief of the American Bankers Ass’n, supra note 20; Brief for Amicus 
Curiae the Clearing House Ass’n, supra note 20. 
 58  See FMLC STUDY, supra note 28, at 11; see also Buchheit & Pam, supra note 25, at 883–92; 
W.M.C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina, 8 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 123, 125 (2013); 
Gulati & Klee, supra note 28, at 650; G. MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE 3 1/2 MINUTE 
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 45−52 , (Univ. of Chicago Press 
2012); See generally Olivares-Caminal, Quest, supra note 25; Brief of the American Bankers Ass’n, 
supra note 20; Brief for Amicus Curiae the Clearing House Ass’n, supra note 20. 
 59  See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1049–51 (2004); see also Schumacher et al., supra 
note 8, at 7–9. 
 60  See Robin Wigglesworth, Vulture Funds Come Under Sovereign Fire, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2013, 10:09 
AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/41a633ae-ab3d-11e2-8c63-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2r QrOZWe2. 
 61  Journalist Felix Salmon presents both sides of the vulture argument.  Compare Felix Salmon, 
Vulture Funds in Distress, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-
salmon/2011/02/23/vulture-funds-in-distress/, with Felix Salmon, In Defense of Vulture Funds (Feb. 24, 
2011), http://www.felixsalmon.com/2007/02/in-defense-of-vulture-funds/. 
 62  See Sam Jones, Singer Banks on the Full Force of Law, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2012, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aaf5e32c-0ee9-11e2-ba6b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2r QrOZWe2. 
 63  See Jonathan Lynn, U.N. Debt Expert to Focus on Vulture Funds, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/21/idUSLDE60K1S8; see also Ashley Seager, MPs Act to Keep 
the Vultures at Bay, GUARDIAN (May 5, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/ 
may/06/vulture-funds.  Jubilee USA Network has been a particularly vocal critic of the vulture fund 
industry.  See JUBILEE USA NETWORK, VULTURE FUNDS AND POOR COUNTRY DEBT: RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICY RESPONSES (2008), available at http://www.jubileeusa.org/fileadmin 
/user_upload/Resources/Policy _Archive/408briefnotevulturefunds.pdf. 
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the industry as an unethical practice that further burdens the poor and 
undermines debt relief for HIPCs.64  Indeed, vulture funds are particularly 
likely to be plaintiffs in legal actions against HIPCs.65  On average, targets 
of vulture litigation tend to be middle income and poor countries that have 
recently undergone serious economic distress.66  Critics also maintain that 
vulture funds benefit a small number of elites at the expense of taxpayers in 
developing countries.67   
Adding to popular intrigue, the vulture industry is also famously 
opaque and often staged from offshore tax havens through various limited 
liability investment vehicles.68  These tendencies reinforce the perception 
that these funds prey on taxpayers in developing countries to benefit 
wealthy tycoons.  Two of the most famous and successful vulture funds 
include Dart Management (founded by Kenneth Dart) and Elliott 
Management (founded by Paul Elliott Singer).69  Dart and Singer are 
prominent faces in the distressed debt industry; both are plaintiffs in NML 
through affiliated entities.70   
Returns in the distressed debt business can be extremely lucrative.71  
But the business model does not suit just anyone; it requires an appetite for 
risk and ample cash for expensive legal battles against sovereigns.72  
Though funds may buy sovereign debt for a fraction of face value, the deep 
discounts usually reflect the likelihood of creditor losses and the significant 
costs and risks associated with collection.  Indeed, full repayment is not the 
 
 64  See Lynn, infra note 66. 
 65  See Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 3 (“‘Vulture’ funds are also particularly likely to initiate 
legal disputes against Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC).  Of the 20 cases filed against HIPC, 13 
were filed by ‘vultures.’”). 
 66  See id. at 12. 
 67  See, e.g., Greg Palast et al., UK Urged to Prevent Vulture Funds Preying on the World’s Poorest 
Countries, GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2011, 6:15 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/ 
2011/nov/15/call-action-vulture-funds-poor. 
 68  Id.  See also Eliana Raszewski, Billionaire Dart’s Argentine Unit Raided by Tax Agents, 
BLOOMBERG (May 21, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-21/billionaire-dart-s-
argentine-foam-cup-unit-raided-by-tax-agents.html (“Dart gave up his U.S. citizenship in the 1990s to 
avoid taxes and moved to the Cayman Islands.”). 
 69  Landon Thomas Jr., Rejecting Greek Debt Deal Results In a Hefty Payoff for the Holdouts, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 16, 2012, § B (Late Edition, Business/Financial Desk), at 3 (stating that the Dart fund’s 
founder is Kenneth Dart, heir to a billion-dollar Styrofoam cup business and a U.S. tax exile who lives 
in the Cayman Islands); see also Jones, supra note 62 (profiling Paul Elliott Singer and the success of 
Elliott Management). 
 70  Drew Benson, Bond Vigilantes’ Ghana Ambush Proves Default Hex Unbroken, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct 4, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-04/bond-vigilantes-ghana-
trap-shows-default-hex-argentina-credit. 
 71  A Victory by Default?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2005), http://www.economist.com/ node/3715779 
(“According to Manmohan Singh, an economist at the [IMF], the annualized returns from successful 
litigation can be more than 300%”). 
 72  See Wigglesworth, supra note 60. 
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norm.  If litigation or collection efforts fail, a distressed debt investor may 
end up taking a total loss.   
Collecting sovereign assets is notoriously difficult.73  Although most 
attachment efforts prove fruitless, they often make headlines—as with the 
attempted seizures of Argentine assets around the world.74  In October 
2012, Elliott Associates persuaded Ghanaian authorities to seize the 
Libertad, a classic three-masted sailing frigate used for naval training and 
goodwill missions.75  After some dramatic moments and a drawn-out legal 
battle, the U.N. Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ordered that the Libertad be 
released.76  Meanwhile, Argentina’s presidential plane, the Tango 01, 
remained conspicuously grounded following the debacle in Ghana.77  Other 
asset skirmishes involved efforts to attach $105 million in reserves held by 
the Central Bank of Argentina.78  On another occasion, the office of a 
representative of the province of Buenos Aires in New York was targeted.  
Even dinosaur fossils on exhibition in Europe were targets for attachment.79  
Though none of these attempts successfully yielded valuable assets, they 
were all costly and embarrassing for Argentina.  The financial impact of 
asset battles can easily run into the millions.80  More difficult to quantify 
but also painful, these skirmishes also involve reputational damage and 
interference with international commerce and other cross-border 
 
 73  See Gelpern, Contract Hope, supra note 31; see also Bratton, supra note 45, at 824 (“Sovereigns 
in default rarely leave valuables lying around subject to attachment in creditor-friendly jurisdictions.”). 
 74  See Benson, supra note 70; see also Gauchos and Gadflies, ECONOMIST (Oct. 22, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21533453. 
 75  See Chris Barrett, Frigate Libertad: Vulture Funds and Cabin Fever in West Africa, ARGENTINA 
INDEP. (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/ frigate-libertad-vulture-
funds-and-cabin-fever-in-west-africa/. 
 76  See Ghana Told to Free Argentine Ship Libertad by UN Court, BBC (Dec. 15, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-20743016. 
 77  See Linette Lopez, Hedge Funder Paul Singer Went Ballistic on Argentina In His Q4 Investor 
Letter, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2013, 1:13 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ elliott-management-q4-
investor-letter-2013-1. 
 78  See U.S. Supreme Court Rules in Favour of Argentina and Unfreezes Funds, MERCOPRESS (June 26, 
2012, 6:25 AM), http://en.mercopress.com/2012/06/26/us-supreme-court-rules-in-favour-of-argentina-and-
unfreezes-funds (describing how the U.S. Supreme Court denied the request for attachment of the Central Bank 
of Argentina reserves in October 2007). 
 79  See Michael Hiltzik, Argentina is Cautionary Tale as U.S. Debates Debt Limit, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 
15, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/15/business/la-fi-hiltzik-201 30116. 
 80 A prominent Argentine newspaper, La Nación, estimated that the seizure of the Libertad in Ghana 
cost the Argentine government around $5 million.  See Mariano De Vedia, Enviar Marinos Para Traer 
la Fragata Costó $5 Millones, LA NACIÓN (Dec. 26, 2012), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1540147-
enviar-marinos-para-traer-la-fragata-costo-5-millones.  The incident cost Ghana several million as well.  
See ARA Libertad: Ghana Port Authority Lost 7.6m Dollars; Could Demand NML Capital, 
MERCOPRESS (Dec. 20, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://en.mercopress.com/2012/12/20/ara-libertad-ghana-port-
authority-lost-7.6m-dollars-could-demand-nml-capital. 
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activities.81  Partially or wholly state-owned enterprises may also be 
targeted in the hunt for assets.82   
 
C. Sovereign Debt and Restructuring 
 
For decades, scholars and multilateral institutions alike have explored 
possibilities for quasi-bankruptcy or debt restructuring regimes for 
sovereigns.83  Yet, no such system exists.  In the absence of a formal 
insolvency regime, sovereign debt defaults typically lead to voluntary 
negotiated restructurings and reissuances of new debt.84  Existing debt 
obligations are exchanged for new debt obligations through negotiated 
restructuring.  Though imperfect, restructuring practices have balanced the 
interests of creditors and sovereign debtors for generations.85  In most cases, 
the vast majority of creditors participate in the debt exchanges because the 
burden of a financial crisis is shared between the debtor and its creditors.86  
“Holdout” creditors are those who decide not to participate in a debt 
exchange whereas “exchange” creditors do.  Institutional lenders, such as 
large banks, prefer participation and collaborative restructuring to holding 
out.  Though hedge funds are usually the most visible and significant 
holdouts, sometimes retail investors or pensioners holdout as well.   
In exchange for granting debt relief to allow a distressed sovereign the 
chance to restore fiscal stability, creditors agree to take a loss—the so-
called “haircut”—and receive newly issued debt.87  Surprisingly, given the 
 
 81  See Panizza et al., supra note 27, at 659–64. 
 82  See Pablo Gonzalez, YPF Slumps as NML’s Singer Seeks Argentine Asset Information, 
BLOOMBERG (Jun. 19, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-19/ypf-slumps-as-nml-s-singer 
-seeks-argentine-asset-information.html. 
 83  For examples of early sovereign insolvency proposals, see generally UNCTAD, TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1986).  See also Bratton, supra note 45; Anna Gelpern, A Skeptic’s Case for 
Sovereign Bankruptcy, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1095 (2013) [hereinafter Gelpern, Bankruptcy]; Anna Gelpern, 
Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 888 (2012) [hereinafter 
Gelpern, Quasi-Sovereign]; Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 
36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 299 (2005); IMF, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING, infra note 227; Kenneth 
Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976–2001, 
49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 470 (2002) . 
 84  See Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 34, at 48 (describing the voluntary nature of sovereign debt 
restructuring and contrasting the practice with the bankruptcy process); see also Anna Gelpern, Building 
a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructurings, 53 EMORY L.J. 1115 (2004) [hereinafter Gelpern, 
Building]. 
 85  See Weidemaier, supra note 58, at 127. 
 86  Between 1997 and 2013, the average participation rate in sovereign debt defaults was 95%.  
During that period, only Argentina and Dominica had participation rates under 90%.  See ELENA 
DUGGAR, MOODY’S, NEW EVIDENCE ON THE ROLE OF HOLDOUT CREDITORS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT 
RESTRUCTURINGS 9 (2013).  
 87  See Bratton, supra note 45, at 828. 
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unenforceability of sovereign debt and voluntary nature of sovereign 
restructuring, creditor haircuts in sovereign debt restructurings (30%, 
weighted for volume) tend to be significantly lower than haircuts in 
corporate bond and loan restructurings in United States (64%).88  But 
without an insolvency regime, sovereigns do not enjoy benefits of debtor-
friendly provisions found, for example, in U.S. bankruptcy law.  Detroit, for 
instance, has relied upon the threat of “cram downs” and bankruptcy 
protections to convince creditors and pensioners to take haircuts.89  
Theoretical models predict that when haircuts are deemed excessive relative 
to the sovereign’s ability to pay, an exchange offer is more likely to fail.90  
Likewise, deep haircuts are more likely to spawn litigation.91   
Although sovereign creditors lack leverage enjoyed by creditors in 
other areas of the law, sovereign borrowers and their creditors have 
resolved disputes through restructuring for generations.92  Despite limited 
enforcement mechanisms, sovereigns have compelling reasons to pay debts.  
Traditionally, sovereign motivation was explained by diplomacy, access to 
markets, sanctions, and reputational factors.93  More recent accounts have 
addressed domestic costs of default as an explanation for sovereign 
motivation, including the political consequences of debt default.94   
 
III.  NML: SOVEREIGN DEBT OUTLIER 
 
The Second Circuit recognized Argentina’s situation as an 
“exceptional” on unlikely to be seen again in the future.95  The Second 
Circuit arrived at this conclusion in light of Argentina’s track record as a 
“recalcitrant” debtor with “a long history of defaulting on its debts,” while 
describing Argentina’s behavior as “extraordinary.”96  Although the Second 
 
 88  See Juan J. Cruces & Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts 10–11 
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 3604, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1943411 (citing MOODY’S, DEFAULT AND RECOVERY RATES OF CORPORATE BOND ISSUERS, 1920–
2005 (2006)). 
 89  See Marcelo Etchebarne, Guest post: Argentina and Detroit – Different (Zip) Codes, FIN. TIMES 
(Mar. 4, 2014), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/03/04/guest-post-argentina-and-detroit-different-
zip-codes/# (underscoring creditor-friendly bankruptcy provisions that are unavailable to sovereigns). 
 90  See Ran Bi et al., The Problem That Wasn’t: Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt 
Restructurings (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/11/265, 2011). 
 91  See Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 22. 
 92  See Weidemaier, supra note 58, at 127. 
 93  See Panizza et al., supra note 27, at 659–64 (reviewing literature exploring questions of why 
sovereigns pay their creditors); see also BORCHARD, supra note 32, at 122. 
 94  See Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, The Costs of Sovereign Default, 56 IMF STAFF PAPERS 
683, 688–90 (2009). 
 95  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, appeal docketed, No. 12-105(L) at 23 
(2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2013). 
 96 I d. 
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Circuit correctly identified this aspect of the NML situation as 
extraordinary, Argentina’s exceptionalism extends to virtually all phases of 
sovereign debt: lending, default, restructuring, and litigation.  Ultimately, 
NML is readily distinguishable from other sovereign debt situations.97   
This part illustrates that NML’s facts make it an outlier by wide 
margins.  First, this part explains Argentina’s exceptional sovereign debt 
history.  Second, Argentina’s default was the largest and most complex in 
world history.98  Third, the circumstances leading up to the 2001 crisis were 
also exceptional, casting doubt about the legitimacy of Argentina’s foreign 
debt—particularly within Argentina’s political system—from the outset of 
the default.99  Fourth, Argentina’s “uniquely unilateral and coercive” 
approach to restructuring was unparalleled, setting the stage for a similarly 
unprecedented flood of sovereign debt litigation.100  Finally, during the 
litigation stage, the Argentine situation has again defied historic trends in 
sovereign debt.101   
 
A. Argentina’s Unique Sovereign Debt History 
 
The Argentine government has been labeled—fairly or unfairly—as a 
“rogue debtor” and a “serial defaulter.”102  Putting it slightly more 
delicately, the Second Circuit opted for the label of “recalcitrant debtor.”103  
As explained in this part, these labels are nothing new for Argentina.  
Almost a decade prior to the 2001 default, one writer observed, “Argentina 
emerged as the single most resistant debtor in international finance.”104  
Studies have concluded that there may be a self-perpetuating aspect to 
serial defaults: the less reputational capital a debtor has to lose, the more 
attractive the default option might become.105   
Though several countries have defaulted more often, Argentina is 
often portrayed as an exceptionally rogue debtor.106  Argentina has nearly a 
 
 97  See id. 
 98  See A Victory by Default?, supra note 71. 
 99  See infra note 147–150 and accompanying text. 
 100  ELENA DUGGAR, MOODY’S, THE ROLE OF HOLDOUT CREDITORS AND CACS IN SOVEREIGN 
DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS 2 (2013). 
 101  See infra Part III.E.   
 102  See Porzecanski, supra note 29, at 316–17.  
 103  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 247 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 104  ERNEST J. OLIVERI, LATIN AMERICAN DEBT AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
164 (1992). 
 105  See, e.g., Carmen M. Reinhart et al., Debt Intolerance 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 9908, 2003). 
 106  See Argentina’s Debt Saga: No Movement, ECONOMIST (Aug. 2, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21610296-argentina-has-defaulted-again-deal-its-creditors-not-
out-question-no?fsrc=scn%2Ftw_ec%2Fno_movement. 
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two centuries long history of difficulties with creditors.107  This history is 
extensive and painful, a “long-festering wound” in Argentina’s side.108  A 
museum at the School of Economic Sciences at the University of Buenos 
Aires has a dedicated exhibit that tells the story from an Argentine 
perspective.109  At one point in the 1840s, Argentine caudillo Juan Manuel 
de Rosas offered to pay bondholders with las Malvinas, which are 
commonly known as the Falkland Islands in English.110  Even the genesis of 
the Paris Club involved an Argentine debt crisis.111   
Argentina led Latin America—and the developing world, for that 
matter—in scholarship on sovereign debt from the perspective of former 
colonies.  Historically, Argentine scholars and diplomats have been at the 
forefront of theory on the law of sovereign debt, especially concerning 
rights of newly independent sovereigns.112  In 1863, Argentine jurist Carlos 
Calvo published the foundations of the highly influential Calvo Doctrine.113  
As Venezuela was facing a “gunboat diplomacy” style intervention by 
European powers in 1902, Luis M. Drago, Argentina’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, wrote a letter that established the Drago Doctrine.114  Both 
doctrines advocate for host government sovereign rights in investment 
disputes, which were especially important to newly independent nations 
emerging from colonialism.115   
 
 107  See Boris Korby & Karia Porzecanski, Argentina Bust Lures Investors After 200 Years of 
Defaults, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3, 2014, 1:45 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-03/ 
argentina-bust-lures-bass-led-investors-in-200-years-of-defaults.html (characterizing Argentina as a 
“deadbeat country with few peers in history”). 
 108  Jude Webber, Debt – Argentina’s Long-Festering Wound, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2012, 3:31 AM), 
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1521e81c-3894-11e2-bd7d-00144feabdc0.html. 
 109  MUSEO DE LA DEUDA EXTERNA, http://www.museodeladeuda.com.ar/ (last visited Feb. 12, 
2014). 
 110  See Emilio Ocampo, El Día que Rosas Quiso Pagar a los Bonistas con las Malvinas, LA NACIÓN 
(Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1544122-el-dia-que-rosas-quiso-pagar-a-los-bonistas-con-
las-malvinas. 
 111  According to the official website of the Paris Club: “The Paris Club is an informal group of 
official creditors whose role is to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties 
experienced by debtor countries.”  The Paris Club has nineteen permanent member countries.  The IMF 
and the World Bank participate in debt negotiations as observers.  See CLUB DE PARIS, 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). 
 112  See EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 466 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 113  The Calvo Doctrine condemned armed and diplomatic interventions for investment disputes.  See 
Amos Hershey, The Calvo and Drago Doctrines, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 26, 26–27 (1907). 
 114  Id. at 30 (“[T]he public debt [of an American state] can not occasion armed intervention, nor 
even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power.” (quoting Letter 
from Luis M. Drago, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Sr. Merou, Argentine Minister at 
Washington (Dec. 29, 1902))). 
 115  See Hershey, supra note 113; see also Amitav Acharya, Ideas, Norms and Regional Orders, in 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND REGIONAL TRANSFORMATION 183 (T.V. Paul ed., 
Cambridge University Press 2012) available at http://www.amitavacharya.com/sites/default/files/ 
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B. Argentina’s Crisis of 2001–2002: “The Worst of All” 
 
During 2001–2002, Argentina suffered an economic crisis of epic 
proportions following a broader wave of emerging market crises that swept 
through East Asia and Russia.116  The collapse was comprehensive and 
tragically spectacular—one of the worst currency crises of the modern era.  
Argentina’s crisis involved the deepest drop in gross domestic product 
(GDP) suffered during peaceful times by any capitalist country with a 
significant economy since at least World War II.117  Real per capita GDP 
fell backwards by three decades.118  The Argentine peso declined 75% 
versus the U.S. dollar in a matter of months.119  Meanwhile, Argentina’s 
public debt ballooned from 45.7% of GDP in 2000 to 166.3% in 2002.120   
Argentina formally defaulted on bonds worth $81.2 billion in 
December of 2001.121  The dimensions of this default were staggering.  As 
illustrated in Figure 1 below, Argentina’s default remains by far the largest 
sovereign debt default in history, dwarfing prior defaults by Russia ($30 
billion), Ecuador ($6 billion), and Uruguay ($5 billion).122  The Argentine 
default was also the most complex ever seen.  Over half a million creditors 
scattered around the world held 152 varieties of defaulted debt instruments, 
which were denominated in six currencies under the laws of eight different 
jurisdictions.123   
 
Ideas%20norms%20and%20regional%20orders.pdf (discussing the role played by the Calvo and Drago 
doctrines in the adoption of the principle of non-intervention in Latin America). 
 116  Due in large part to a steep climb in interest rates, debt rollover costs spiked in the wake of the 
crises in East Asia and Russia.  The rising cost of financing exacerbated Argentina’s already 
unsustainable debt load.  See Mario Damill et al., Las Cuentas Públicas y la Crisis de la Convertibilidad 
en la Argentina, 43 DESARROLLO ECONÓMICO 203 (2003). 
 117  Lucas Llach, A Depression in Perspective: The Economic and the Political Economy of 
Argentina’s Crisis of the Millenium, in THE ARGENTINE CRISIS AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENIUM 40 
(Flavia Fiourcci & Marcus Klein eds., 2004). 
 118  See J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32637, ARGENTINA’S SOVEREIGN DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING 5 (2004). 
 119  See PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND OUT) 2 (2006). 
 120  See HORNBECK, supra note 13, at 3. 
 121  See A Victory by Default?, supra note 71, at 1. 
 122  See ELENA DUGGAR, MOODY’S, SOVEREIGN DEFAULT AND RECOVERY RATES, 1983-2007 7–8 
(2008), available at https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/DefaultResearch/2007100000482445.pdf.  
Greece’s debt exchange in 2012 became the largest sovereign restructuring in history but did not involve 
a technical default.  See Landon Thomas Jr., Next Time, Greece May Need New Tactics, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 2012/03/10/business/global/greece-debt-restructuring-deal-
private-lenders.html?pagewanted =all&_r=0. 
 123  See A Victory by Default?, supra note 71, at 1. 
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Source: Moody’s (2013) 
 
As the economy crashed, so did the nation’s government and banking 
systems.124  Political upheaval ensued as looting, protests, and even rioting 
took hold of urban centers.125  At one point, Argentina technically had five 
presidents in the course of two weeks.126  For Argentines, who are rather 
accustomed to enduring crises, this was la peor de todas, the worst of all.127  
Social costs were tragic.  Argentina, a country with a history of relative 
prosperity and an established middle class, saw over half of its population 
fall below the poverty line.128  Post crisis, approximately 25% of Argentina 
lived in extreme poverty compared to just 4% in 1992.129  Unemployment 
exceeded 20%.130  Malnutrition became a serious problem in a country 
renowned for fine beef and abundant grains.131  Living standards dropped 
 
 124  See Clifford Krauss, Reeling from Riots, Argentina Declares a State of Siege, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
20, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/20/world/reeling-from-riots-argentina-declares-a-state-of-
siege.html. 
 125  Id.; see also BLUSTEIN, supra note 119, at 184–87, 190–96 (explaining the political, social, and 
economic chaos that arrived with the 2001 crisis). 
 126  See New Man Takes Helm in Argentina, BBC AMERICAS (Jan. 2, 2002, 7:12 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1737562.stm. 
 127  See Jorge Oviedo, Crisis, la Peor de Todas, LA NACIÓN (July 14, 2002), 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/413669-crisis-la-peor-de-todas. 
 128  See LEONARDO GASPARINI, CEDLAS-THE WORLD BANK, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN 
ARGENTINA: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND A LITERATURE REVIEW 35 (2004), available at 
http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/monitoreo/pdfs/review_argentina.pdf. 
 129  Id. 
 130  See SHINJI TAKAGI, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OFFICE, IMF, THE IMF AND ARGENTINA 1991-
2001 8 (2004), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2004/ arg/eng/pdf/report.pdf. 
 131  See Larry Rohter, Once Secure, Argentines Now Lack Food and Hope, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/02/world/once-secure-argentines-now-lack-food-and-hope.html?page 
wanted=all&src=pm; see also Hannah Baldock, Child Hunger Deaths Shock Argentina, GUARDIAN (Nov. 
24, 2002), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2002/nov/25/famine.argentina. 
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dramatically and Argentines watched their wealth evaporate in the wake of 
deep currency devaluations and capital flight.   
 
C. Exceptional Circumstances: The Other Crisis (of Legitimacy) 
 
The history behind NML raises poignant legitimacy questions and 
helps explain the politics of Argentina’s behavior towards creditors.  Just 
years before the largest sovereign default in world history, Argentina had 
been the emerging market darling of the international financial 
community.132  Under President Carlos Saúl Menem in the 1990s, 
Argentina adhered to the “Washington Consensus,” removing trade 
barriers, deregulating the economy, welcoming foreign investment, and 
privatizing key industries.133  During this time, Argentina was continuously 
engaged with the IMF through policy advice and five successive financing 
arrangements.134  Argentina was widely considered a “star pupil” of the 
IMF.135  In 1998, President Menem was invited to address the IMF at its 
annual meeting to discuss the “absolute economic miracle” Argentina had 
undergone during his administration.136   
On one hand, there is little doubt that Argentina was the victim of self-
inflicted damage.  The government overborrowed while failing to practice 
the fiscal discipline required by a strict currency regime and its own 
economic policies.137  Ultimately, responsibility for the failed policies of 
the 1990s belongs to the Argentine government.138  On the other hand, 
Argentina was not alone in setting the stage for the largest sovereign debt 
default in history.139  Wall Street, the IMF, and even the broader 
 
 132  See Todd Jatras, Cavallo To Argentina’s Rescue, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2001, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2001/03/22/0322argentina.html (characterizing Argentina’s economy minister, 
Domingo Cavallo, as a “Wall Street darling”); see also Ken Parks, Taos Turner & John Lyons, 
Argentina Reels: A Populist Formula Goes Flat, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2014, at A1 (describing 
Argentina’s “long decline from a darling of global capitalism to economic pariah”). 
 133  See BLUSTEIN, supra note 119, at 4. 
 134  See TAKAGI, supra note 130, at 9, 77. 
 135  See Hector Tobar, The Good Life Is No More for Argentina, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2003), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/feb/18/world/fg-argecon18. 
 136  CARLOS SARL MENEM, PRESIDENT, REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA, STATEMENT TO THE 1998 JOINT 
ANNUAL MEETINGS (Oct. 6, 1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/am/1998/speeches/ 
pr05e.pdf. 
 137  Enacted under the Menem Administration in 1991 and intended to curb the kind of hyperinflation 
spikes that toppled the Alfonsín Administration, Argentina’s “convertibility” plan pegged the Argentine 
peso to the U.S. dollar.  However, coupled with unsustainable debt and public spending, the rigid plan 
eventually set the stage for the 2001 default.  See TAKAGI, supra note 130, at 3 (2004). 
 138  See BLUSTEIN, supra note 119, at 199 (critiquing the “popular myth” that the IMF was dictating 
Argentina’s economic policy throughout the 1990s.). 
 139  See Todd Benson, Report Looks Harshly at I.M.F.’s Role in Argentine Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 30, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/30/business/report-looks-harshly-at-imf-s-role-in-
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international finance community compounded Argentina’s crisis 
significantly.140   
After the crisis, the IMF published a self-critical evaluation of its role 
in Argentina’s crisis.141  An independent report by the Independent 
Evaluation Office of the IMF was even more critical of the IMF’s role in 
Argentina’s debt situation.142  As noted by the Economist in 2005, 
“Argentina defaulted so heavily because it defaulted so late.”143  If 
anything, Argentina may have been too reluctant to default on its 
obligations, racking up billions more in debt when default was already an 
inevitable conclusion.144  Two loans extended in 2001, for instance, only 
exacerbated the existing debt burden.145   
The causal inquiry into Argentina’s crash is a well-documented and 
vigorously debated topic.146  Analyzing the economic meltdown is beyond 
the scope of this Article, but the backlash within Argentina against the IMF 
and the international financial community is particularly relevant here.  
Combined with rising poverty and high unemployment, this perception of 
great injustice—however accurate—brought the legitimacy of Argentina’s 
international obligations and external debt into doubt from the outset of the 
crash.147  As part of the exceptional nature of Argentina’s sovereign debt 
situation, this reaction shaped the behavior of Argentina’s leaders during 
the restructuring process and continues to influence policy towards holdout 
creditors.148  Vulture funds are widely despised in Argentina; settling with 
 
argentine-debt-crisis.html?pagewanted=print&src=pm. 
 140  Id.; see also Argentina: Writing of the Wreckage, ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2005), 
http://www.economist.com/node/3714880 (“Wall Street investment banks raked in fees for issuing yet 
more Argentine bonds even as some of their analysts were privately gloomy about the country.”); see 
also BLUSTEIN, supra note 119, at 199–200.  
 141  See POLICY DEV. & REVIEW DEP’T, IMF, LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS IN ARGENTINA 63–67 
(2003), available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/lessons/100803.pdf. 
 142  See TAKAGI, supra note 130. 
 143  A Victory by Default?, supra note 71. 
 144  Id.  
 145  See Argentina: Writing of the Wreckage, supra note 140. 
 146  For a thorough review of the literature, see IMF, LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS IN ARGENTINA, 
supra note 141, at 5. 
 147  The IMF’s contributing role in exacerbating Argentina’s debt load impacted the perceived 
legitimacy of foreign debt.  See BLUSTEIN, supra note 119; see also Cephas Lumina, United Nations 
Independent Expert, End of Mission Statement (Nov. 29, 2013), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14040&LangID=E (noting 
questions about legitimacy of debt acquired prior to the 2001 default); Larry Rohter, Argentine Leader 
Slashes Debt and Tightens Grip, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2006/01/03/world/ americas/03iht-buenos.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 148  See Argentina’s Kirchner Boosts Approval on IMF Clashes (Update 1), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 6, 
2004), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=afHs6w HOB6JI; see also 
BLUSTEIN, supra note 119, at 206–07; Patrice M. Jones, President Buoys Argentina, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 
27, 2003), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/ 2003-11-27/news/0311270371_1_president-nestor-
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them is a politically charged issue with practical and moral implications.149  
Argentina entered into default following the NML ruling instead of settling 
with the holdouts, although this decision may have had more to do with 
potential liabilities stemming from the so-called RUFO clause than with 
distaste for the vultures.150   
 
D. An Unparalleled Debt Restructuring 
 
Restructuring negotiations following Argentina’s default were easily 
among the most adversarial restructuring negotiations ever.  The Argentine 
restructuring defied established guidelines of sovereign debt negotiation 
and was widely considered “unique in its unilateral and coercive approach 
to the debt restructuring.”151  President Néstor Kirchner took a hard line, 
insisting that creditors take a sizeable haircut in line with Argentina’s 
devastating losses.152  The IMF, usually a key participant in sovereign debt 
restructuring negotiations, was much less involved due to controversy 
surrounding the Fund’s role leading up to Argentina’s economic crisis.   
In January 2005, after years of bitter negotiations, Argentina opened a 
bond exchange (the 2005 Exchange) hoping to reach a final settlement on 
as many of the defaulted bonds as possible—roughly $104.1 billion in 
principal ($81.2 billion) and past due interest ($22.9 billion).153  At that 
time, the $104.1 billion in defaulted bonds only represented about 53% of 
Argentina’s total of $194.6 billion in unsustainable public debt.154  As a 
consequence, bondholders shouldered a disproportionate burden in 
Argentina’s attempt to achieve a sustainable level of debt through 
restructuring.155   
Like the crisis and the default, the 2005 Exchange was exceptional 
across the board: the amount in default ($104.1 billion), the lengthy 
duration of the restructuring process (over three years), the deep creditor 
haircut (roughly 76%), and the low participation rate (only 72% of 
bondholders).156  In an average restructuring, negotiations last seven months 
and participation exceeds 95%.  Representing par value of $62.3 billion, 
 
kirchner-president-carlos-menem-amnesty-laws. 
 149  See John Paul Rathbone et al., Argentina in default as contest with holdouts enters endgame, FIN. 
TIMES (June 29, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/15c4c27e-fded-11e3-acf8-00144f 
eab7de.html. 
 150  Argentina’s Endless Debt Dilemma, FIN. TIMES (Jul. 31, 2014, 6:39 PM), http://www.ft.com/ 
intl/cms/s/0/561bb58c-18a8-11e4-a51a-00144feabdc0.html. 
 151  DUGGAR, supra note 100. 
 152  See HORNBECK, supra note 121, at 6–11. 
 153  Id. at 3. 
 154  Id. 
 155  Id. 
 156  See DUGGAR, supra note 100. 
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creditors received roughly 35 cents on the dollar in the 2005 Exchange.157  
Comparisons with average indicators in other sovereign debt exchanges 
indicate the truly exceptional nature of Argentina’s restructuring, as 
illustrated in Figures 2–4 below.   
 
 
Source for Figures 2–3: Moody’s Investors Service (2013) 
 
Source for Figure 4: Cruces and Trebesch (2011) 
At 72%, the participation rate of the 2005 Exchange fell far below the 
mean (Figure 2).158  Between 1997 and 2013, the average participation rate 
in sovereign debt exchanges was 95%.159  All but two restructurings—
Argentina and Dominica—had participation rates over 90%.160  Through 
subsequent negotiations, Argentina achieved almost 93% participation and 
 
 157  A Victory By Default?, supra note 71. 
 158  See DUGGAR, supra note 100. 
 159  Id. 




















Argentina (77%) Average (37%) Weighted Avg (30%) 
Figure 4: Creditor Haircut (%) 
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Dominica achieved almost 100%.161  But in Argentina’s case, achieving 
even this modest level of participation took the better part of a decade. 
According to one model, deeper haircuts decrease creditor 
participation and increase the likelihood of holdouts and litigation.162  As 
illustrated in Figure 4 above, in a sample of 180 restructurings from 1970 to 
2010, the haircut imposed on Argentina’s creditors (roughly 77% in the 
2005 Exchange) comes in far above average.163  The average haircut during 
that period was 37% or just 30% in a volume weighted average.164  Again, 
Argentina’s sovereign debt situation is a quantitative outlier that defies 
modern restructuring trends.165  Even the tone of the negotiations were 
exceptionally bitter, described as “unusually contentious”166 and 
“unique[ly] . . . unilateral and coercive”167 by prominent observers.   
However, the haircut story has a second chapter.  Though the nominal 
haircut during the 2005 Exchange was unusually deep, Argentina’s bond 
issuances in the 2005 and 2010 Exchanges included warranty payments 
linked to the country’s future GDP growth.  The GDP warrants provide that 
bondholders receive payments when Argentina’s GDP growth exceeds 
predefined annual benchmarks.168  In this way, the GDP-linked bonds 
resembled equity shares in Argentina’s economy, which fared remarkably 
well in years following the 2005 Exchange in large part due to robust 
international demand for commodities like soy and grain as well as 
automobile exports to Brazil.169   
Holders of GDP-linked warrants saw dramatic gains in years following 
the debt restructurings.  As a result, Argentina’s haircut turned out to be 
fairly close to average for a sovereign restructuring: returns on the GDP-
linked warrants reduced Argentina’s haircut from roughly 77% to less than 
 
 161  Id. 
 162  See Bi et al., supra note 90, at 4. 
 163  Cruces & Trebesch, supra note 88, at 10–11.  
 164  Id. 
 165  See Bi et al., supra note 90, at 19 (characterizing Argentina’s restructuring as the “one major 
exception” to modern sovereign debt restructuring trends). 
 166  Anna Gelpern, What Bond Markets Can Learn From Argentina, 24 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 19, 19 
(April 2005) (“It is hard to find a public or private sector participant who did not care or one who did 
not feel deeply wronged.”). 
 167  DUGGAR, supra note 100. 
 168  See REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA, PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (TO PROSPECTUS DATED DEC. 27, 
2004) S-64–66 (2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ data/914021/ 0000950123 
05000302/y04567e424b5.htm [hereinafter PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT]. 
 169  See Miguel Kiguel, Argentina’s Debt: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, in THINK TANK 20: THE 
G-20 AND CENTRAL BANKS IN THE NEW WORLD OF UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY 6 (2013) 
(indicating that GDP-linked bonds have reduced Argentina’s haircut to less than 40%), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2013/08/g20%20central%20banks%20mone
tary%20policy/TT20%20central%20banks%20monetary%20policy%202.pdf. 
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40%.170  Because the GDP warrants were given almost no value at the time 
of the exchange negotiations, this gain for investors has been Argentina’s 
loss.  Between 2006 and 2013, the warrants have returned 43% a year.171  
Payment caps on the GDP warrants limit the total amount that can be paid 
to 48 cents on the dollar, which still allows for further reduction in the true 
restructuring haircut.  To date, Argentina has paid almost $10 billion under 
the GDP warrants.172 
Considering the scale and exceptional nature of Argentina’s default, it 
may not be surprising that the duration of Argentina’s restructuring 
negotiations was far longer than average as well.  Forty months elapsed 
before the 2005 Exchange—more than double the eighteen-month average 
for a restructuring negotiation (Figure 3).173  Even more impressive, this 
comparison does not consider time elapsed between the 2001 default and 
the 2010 Exchange, which accounted for about 15% of the total bonds 
exchanged. 
 Also outside the norm were the extent and formality of Argentina’s 
measures to prohibit payments to holdout bondholders.  While prioritization 
of payments—or even nonpayments—is fairly common in sovereign debt, 
measures like Argentina’s are rare.  Leading up to the 2005 Exchange, 
Argentina insisted that holdouts would remain excluded from future 
payments on the defaulted bonds.174  These intentions were formally 
acknowledged in the “rights upon future offers” (RUFO) clause of 
Argentina’s restructuring prospectus, which assured exchange bondholders 
that subsequent exchange offers would not contain superior terms to the 
2005 Exchange.175  Government officials reinforced this position vowing 
never to pay holdouts.  But Argentina went further in passing Law 26017 
known as la ley cerrojo (the Padlock Law), which prohibited the Argentine 
executive from reopening an exchange offer with holdout creditors: 
“Article 2 – The national Executive Branch may not, with respect to the 
[holdout bounds], reopen the swap process established in the [2005 
 
 170  See STEPHANY GRIFFITH-JONES & DAGMAR HERTOVA, CESIFO DICE REPORT, GROWTH-
LINKED BONDS (2013), available at http://policydialogue.org/files/publications/CESifo_DICE-
Report_3-2013_Griffith-JonesHertova_Final_draft.pdf; see also Drew Benson & Boris Korby, 
Argentina’s ‘Scorching’ Growth Helps GDP Warrants Trump Bonds on 28% Surge, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 
10, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-10/argentina-s-scorching-growth-helps-
gdp-warrants-trump-bonds-on-28-surge.html; Hilary Burke, Buy or Sell - Argentine GDP Warrants Still 
Have Room to Grow?, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2010, 6:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ article/2010/10/01/ 
buysell-argentina-gdpwarrants-idUSN0120720420101001. 
 171  See Charlie Devereux & Katia Porzecanski, Argentine GDP Warrants Plunge as Growth Misses 
Trigger, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-28/argentine-
warrant-holders-seen-losing-out-as-gdp-misses-forecast.html. 
 172  GRIFFITH-JONES & HERTOVA, supra note 170, at 36. 
 173  DUGGAR, supra note 100, at 4, 6. 
 174  See HORNBECK, supra note 13, at 5. 
 175  See PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 168, at S-69. 
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Exchange offer].”176   
Despite promises to the contrary, but in an effort to increase overall 
restructuring participation, Argentina opened a second exchange offer in 
April of 2010 (the 2010 Exchange) with substantially similar payment 
terms as the 2005 Exchange.  Argentina passed Law 26547 (the Padlock 
Law Suspension),177 to temporarily suspend the Padlock Law and thus 
enable the 2010 Exchange.178  Again, the 2010 Exchange prospectus 
reinforced previous statements warning that nonexchange bonds could 
remain in default indefinitely.179  The 2010 Exchange closed in December 
of 2010 with roughly 67% participation among outstanding holders of 
defaulted bonds, bringing Argentina from 76% to 91.3% in overall 
exchange participation rate.180   
 
E. Argentina as a Sovereign Defendant 
 
Argentina has been no less exceptional at the dispute phase.  Between 
1976 and 2010, one study identified 108 sovereign debt cases against 25 
sovereign debtors.181  Almost 88% of these cases were filed in the United 
States, mainly in the Southern District of New York, underscoring the 
importance of New York law for sovereign debt litigation.182  With 41 out 
of 108 total cases, Argentina accounted for a weighty 37% of sovereign 
debt cases filed between 1976 and 2013.183  As illustrated in Figure 5 
below, the rest of the pack is far behind: Peru had 12, Iraq 4, and Nicaragua 
4.184 
 
 176  See Law No. 26017, art. 2, Feb. 10, 2005, B.O. 30590 (Arg.). 
 177  Law 26547 reiterated that the Argentine government was prohibited from offering holdouts that 
had initiated judicial action more favorable treatment than what has been offered to exchange 
bondholders.  See Law No. 26547, art. 1, Dec. 9, 2009, B.O. 31798 (Arg.). 
 178  Id. 
 179  See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251–53 (2d. Cir. 2012). 
 180  See HORNBECK, supra note 13, at 7. 
 181  See Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 11. 
 182  Id. 
 183  Id. 
 184  Id. 
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Source: Schumacher, et al. (2013) 
	   Estimated volumes of litigation also illustrate the extraordinary nature 
of Argentina’s sovereign debt situation.  At $3.7 billion, Argentina’s 
amount under litigation is approximately seventy-four times the average 
claim of $50 million, as illustrated in Table 6.185  After Argentina, the next 
largest amount litigated involved Brazil in the $1.4 billion CIBC v. Brazil 
lawsuit.186  Even still, these samples only represent one component of 
Argentina’s legal crisis: The Argentine government estimates as much as 
$15 billion in holdout claims remain in default, including the $1.3 billion at 
stake in NML.187  In addition to the sovereign debt litigation, Argentina 
faced loan defaults 188 and an avalanche of investment arbitration claims in 
forums such as the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes.189 
Argentina has been a unique adversary to holdouts and plaintiffs.  
Sovereigns are rarely eager to cooperate with vulture plaintiffs, but perhaps 
no other government has taken such strong measures as Argentina to 
prevent payments from reaching holdouts adversaries.190  Indeed, 
 
 185  See Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 11–12. 
 186  CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 187  See Russo & Porzecanski, supra note 19, at 2. 
 188  See HORNBECK, supra note 118, at 2–3. 
 189  See Argentina Faces 65bn Dollars In Claims; Plans to Abandon International Litigations Court, 
MERCOPRESS (Nov. 28, 2012, 8:28 PM), http://en.mercopress.com/ 2012/11/28/argentina-faces-65bn-dollars-
in-claims-plans-to-abandon-international-litigations-court (“Argentina faces 42 claims at the World Bank’s 
ICSID in which the plaintiffs are demanding compensations for almost 65 billion dollars . . . .”). 
 190  See Robin Wigglesworth & Jude Webber, Markets: An Unforgiven Debt, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2012, 
7:47 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/11558dc6-3888-11e2-bd7d-00144feabdc0.html (“Argentina’s obstinacy 
also makes it an outlier in the history of sovereign restructurings.”). 
Figure 5:  
Number of Sovereign Debt Lawsuits,  
1976–2010 Argentina (41) 
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Argentina’s Padlock Law and prospectus statements are unusual for their 
certainty, formality, and openly public nature.191   
Clashing with creditors has its costs.  Argentina has suffered 
exceptionally harsh market penalties—yet another anomalous aspect of 
Argentina’s situation.192  Typically, markets have fairly short memories; 
sovereigns are usually readmitted to capital markets just two years after a 
default.193  Argentina, however, remains essentially shunned from 
international capital markets to date.194  This exclusion is largely associated 
with its so-called “pariah” status due to Argentina’s ongoing disputes with 
investors and creditors.  As a result, the Fernández Kirchner government 
has resorted to creative—but controversial and arguably unsustainable— 
methods to raise capital.195   
 
IV.  THE NML DECISION 
 
NML stems from Argentina’s 2001 default.  While Argentina has made 
all payments due on the exchange bonds following the 2005 and 2010 
Exchanges, no payments were made on holdout bonds.196  Led by NML 
Capital, a diverse coalition of holdout plaintiffs sued Argentina in the 
Southern District of New York.  The NML plaintiffs successfully argued 
that Argentina violated the pari passu clause by paying the exchange 
bondholders without paying holdout bondholders.197  The court’s holding 
was possible because it found Argentina’s pari passu obligations required 
ratable payments to all bondholders.  Further, the court remedied this 
 
 191  See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251–53 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 192  The impact of the default has lasted much longer for Argentina, likely due to the nature and 
length of the restructuring process as well as reputational damage.  See Borensztein & Panizza, supra 
note 94, at 22  (“Reputation of sovereign borrowers that fall in default, as measured by credit ratings and 
spreads, is tainted, but only for a short time.”). 
 193  See id. 
 194  This outcome is consistent with findings of one recent study suggesting that deeper haircuts 
result in harsher consequences for sovereigns.  See Cruces & Trebesch, supra note 88; see also 
MONETARY & CAPITAL MKT. DEP’T, IMF, A SURVEY OF EXPERIENCES WITH EMERGING MARKET 
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS 19 (2012), available at www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/ 
2012/060512.pdf (“The case of Argentina perhaps remains the most extreme, where the country has not 
been able to access the global markets since its 2001 default.”). 
 195  See HORNBECK, supra note 13, at 6 (“Argentina has met its financial needs by monetizing its 
debt, placing bonds with domestic government agencies, restructuring domestically held debt, selling 
bonds directly to the government of Venezuela, and nationalizing private pension funds”); see also 
Argentina’s State-Owned Firms: So Far, Not So Good, ECONOMIST (May 12, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21554569. 
 196  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 2012). 
     197 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978(TPG), 2011 WL 9522565, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011). 
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breach by granting broad injunctive relief applicable to third parties.198  
Plaintiffs won again on appeal when a unanimous panel of the Second 
Circuit substantially affirmed the orders.199  In February 2014, Argentina 
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court for review of 
the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Argentina’s pari passu obligations.  
Review was denied in June 2014.200   
This Part focuses on Argentina’s pari passu clause and the 
significance of the NML decision in the broader context of a rogue trend 
towards ratable payment injunctions in pari passu litigation.  First, this Part 
reviews the emergence of pari passu litigation and the competing 
interpretations of the pari passu clause.  Next, this Part analyzes the Second 
Circuit’s approach to Argentina’s pari passu clause and the consequences 
this approach has for judicial remedies. 
 
A. Competing Interpretations of Pari Passu 
 
The pari passu trend in sovereign debt litigation is the most recent and 
potentially the most disruptive development to date.  Although the erosion 
of sovereign immunity since 1976 and the disposal of classic state defenses 
during the 1980s–1990s made obtaining a judgment against a sovereign 
more feasible, the challenge of collection remained constant.  But with 
rogue decisions in pari passu litigation, namely Elliott and NML, a critical 
pillar of unenforceability is now under stress.  In these cases, courts have 
interpreted pari passu broadly enough to support a radical solution to 
sovereign unenforceability—sweeping injunctive remedies applicable to 
third parties. 
Though the Latin phrase pari passu literally means “in equal step,” 
which refers to equal footing among obligations, the exact meaning of the 
clause in sovereign debt contracts remains unclear.  A version of the pari 
passu clause appears in most public and private international debt 
instruments, including syndicated loans and bonds.201  Over time, and 
perhaps somewhat inadvertently, the clause appears to have migrated from 
secured cross-border private lending to unsecured sovereign debt lending.202  
Historically, the pari passu covenant has been something of an 
afterthought—a short boilerplate clause that rarely occupies more than two 
sentences in complex, intensely negotiated credit instruments.203  The pari 
 
 198  Id. at *3. 
 199  See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d at 250. 
 200  See Russo & Porzecanski, supra note 19, at 1. 
 201  See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 25, at 906. 
 202  Id. at 875. 
 203  Id. at 920 (describing the pari passu clause as “an obscure boilerplate provision”); ALLEN & 
OVERY, THE PARI PASSU CLAUSE AND THE ARGENTINE CASE 10 (2012), available at 
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passu clause in Argentina’s 1994 Fiscal Agency Agreement, pursuant to 
which the holdout bonds were issued, reads as follows: 
 
The securities will constitute . . . direct, unconditional, unsecured 
and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic and shall at all 
times rank pari passu without any preference among themselves.  
The payment obligations of the Republic under the Securities 
shall at all times rank at least equally with all its other present and 
future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness.204 
 
At the heart of the current pari passu controversy are two competing 
interpretations of the clause: a “narrow” reading versus a “broad” or 
“ratable payment” reading.  Both sides of this debate were represented in 
amicus briefs filed in NML.205  The broad reading of pari passu developed 
through a handful of cases brought since 2000.206  This approach takes a 
broad view of the scope of the pari passu covenant by interpreting the 
second sentence of Argentina’s clause above to prohibit prioritizing other 
“payment obligations” in making the payments themselves.207  Unlike the 
narrow approach, the broad reading considers that prioritizing payments—
for instance, paying exchange bondholders but not holdouts—may 
constitute a subordination of rank.  Essentially, the broad reading extends 
beyond formal, legal subordination to prohibit de facto subordination as 
well. 
Thus, the broad approach implies a requirement not only to maintain 
legal rank equally, but also to make payments equally—or on a pro rata 
basis—when a debtor is unable to pay all obligations in full.  The pro rata 
extension is especially critical because it provides legal grounds for the 
injunctive relief, including court orders to third parties, seen in Elliott and 
 
http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/The%20pari%20passu%20 
clause%20and%20the%20Argentine%20case.pdf (“[T]he [pari passu] clause is generally regarded as 
boilerplate without great force”); Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support of the 
Republic of Argentina’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital Ltd., 
No. 12-1494, 2013 WL 3930517, at *7 (2013). 
 204  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d at 251. 
 205  For positions against the NML ratable payment interpretation of pari passu, see Salmon, supra 
note 64 and accompanying text.  For positions supporting the NML interpretation, see Brief for Amicus 
Curiae Kenneth W. Dam in Support of Affirmance, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-
105-cv(L), 2013 WL 100419  (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (arguing in favor of ratable payment interpretation 
of pari passu and third party injunctions); Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Appellees Urging Affirmance, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-
cv(L), 2013 WL 210378 (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2013); Brief of Amici Curiae Italian Holders of Argentine 
Sovereign Bonds in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 
12-105-cv(L) (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2013). 
 206  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 207  See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d at 18–19. 
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NML.  This represents a drastic change in a sovereign’s options in debt 
restructurings—namely the ability to prioritize payments, long considered a 
privilege of sovereign borrowers.208  In effect, this interpretation prohibits a 
sovereign from making payments on restructured bonds without paying 
holdouts. 
On the other hand, proponents of the narrow reading insist that the 
pari passu obligations involve two prongs: one internal and the other 
external.209  In other words, the first sentence of pari passu addresses 
subordination within a bond issuance whereas the second sentence pertains 
to changes in rank across all indebtedness.210  Key to the narrow 
interpretation is the usage of the word “rank” in the second sentence, which 
continues to mean “rank” rather than to “be paid.”  Practically speaking, the 
narrow reading affords scarce protection to creditors.  Short of establishing 
a “legal basis” for discrimination among creditors—for example the 
Padlock Law—the narrow reading does not limit a sovereign’s ability to 
prioritize payments.   
As a result, while the narrow approach may forbid legal subordination 
it does not prohibit a sovereign from making differential payments among 
creditors.  This understanding of a sovereign’s ability to prioritize payments 
is supported by generations of prevailing practices and norms in sovereign 
debt.211  The distinction between the broad ratable payment obligations and 
the narrow prohibition on formal subordination is vital to the question of 
remedies.  Only a broad reading of Argentina’s pari passu obligations could 
support the ratable payment injunctions prescribed by the court in NML.   
 
B. The NML Approach to Pari Passu 
 
Even if the Second Circuit’s opinion does not definitively embrace the 
broad interpretation, the decisions certainly point in that direction.  The 
Second Circuit distanced itself from a definitive interpretation of 
Argentina’s pari passu clause in its most recent opinion.212  Yet the court 
upheld the ratable payment injunctions, which created an awkward and 
uncertain gap in the opinion’s reasoning.  In the Second Circuit’s view, 
Argentina’s overall course of conduct—its “extraordinary behavior”—
amounted to a constructive subordination of the holdout bonds.213  More 
specifically, the district court found subordination in (a) Argentina’s 
 
 208  See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 209  See, e.g., Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22; FMLC STUDY, supra note 
28, at 5. 
 210  See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 3. 
 211  See Weidemaier, supra note 58, at 127. 
  212  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 247 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2013). 
 213  Id. 
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continuing payments to exchange bondholders and (b) legislation 
prohibiting payments to holdouts, namely the Padlock Law and the Padlock 
Law Suspension.214   
Instead of committing to an interpretation of pari passu obligations, 
the Second Circuit opted for ambiguity.215  Neither the district court nor the 
appeals opinion clearly specified whether either action—prioritizing 
payments or the Padlock Law—taken on its own would constitute 
subordination.  Under any interpretation of Argentina’s pari passu clause, a 
formal legal subordination, such as the Padlock Law, would almost 
certainly amount to a violation of the clause.  Accordingly, Argentina’s 
actions could probably be considered a breach of either the broad or the 
narrow reading of the pari passu clause.  The lack of clarity in the opinions 
may reflect tension between a desire to hold Argentina to account and 
awareness of the potentially awkward precedent. 
A narrow view of pari passu in NML could have mitigated disruptive 
consequences and uncertainties for sovereign debt markets.  Sovereigns 
rarely pass legislation similar to the Padlock Law.  Such a holding would 
have also put other sovereigns on notice that this kind of legislation could 
breach pari passu obligations.216  But it was perhaps the question of 
remedies that guided the Second Circuit away from the narrow reading of 
pari passu.  The court’s ratable payment injunctions prescribed by the court 
depend on a broad reading of the pari passu clause.217  At least one 
prominent observer wondered if the court, exasperated with Argentina’s 
disregard for judicial authority, might have been grasping for a way to 
punish the “recalcitrant” defendant.218   
The court’s ratable payment injunctions forbid Argentina from making 
payments to exchange bondholders without paying the plaintiff holdouts. 
Expecting Argentina to defy its orders, the court aimed the injunctions 
beyond Argentina to include third parties, including financial service 
providers.  The court’s injunctions cast a shockingly wide net: orders were 
aimed at “all parties involved, directly or indirectly, in advising upon, 
preparing, processing, or facilitating any payment of the Exchange 
Bonds.”219  Essentially, having realized that Argentina would continue to 
 
 214  Order, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08-CV-6978 (TPG), 2011 WL 9522565, 
at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011). 
 215  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 247 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2013). 
 216  See ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 203, at 11. 
 217  See supra notes 209–14 and accompanying text.  
 218  Gelpern, Contract Hope, supra note 31; Floyd Norris, The Muddled Case of Argentine Bonds, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/25/ business/rulings-add-to-the-mess-in-
argentine-bonds.html (addressing complexities of the NML decision that “Judge Griesa seems not to 
have understood”). 
 219  Order at 4, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 09-CV-01707 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 
2012). 
_JD_Samples Final Read_1.24.15.docx (DO NOT  DELETE) 3/12/15  7:53 AM 
Rogue Trends in Sovereign Debt 
35:49 (2014) 
81 
defy judicial orders, the court decided to enforce its judgments against 
innocent—yet likely compliant—third parties.220 
In justifying these drastic remedies, the court found that “the equities 
and the public interest strongly support issuance of equitable relief” to 
prevent Argentina from further breach of its pari passu obligations.221  
Without means to hold an unwilling sovereign to account, the court resorted 
to drastic enforcement measures, which rely on an ambitious reading of 
Argentina’s pari passu obligations.  Facing limited enforcement options, 
the temptation of these injunctions is understandable.  However, the result 
is a dramatic overcorrection for unenforceability—a highly complex one 
with significant costs.  It is difficult to imagine that sovereigns like 
Argentina have been signing away generations of restructuring practices—
essentially promising not to restructure—with just two sentences of 
ambiguous text.  Crafting radical judicial remedies with small shreds of 
ambiguous language seems overzealous, given the high stakes in a critical 
area of law. 
 
V.  ROGUE TRENDS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT 
 
Problems associated with rogue creditors and rogue debtors are widely 
known and frequently discussed.222  Less visible, but no less important, is 
the problem of rogue courts or rogue precedent in sovereign debt.  Market 
participants have long recognized this threat to orderly restructuring posed 
by rogue courts.223  Cases like Elliott and NML illustrate the potential of 
rogue precedent to produce unpredictable results and uncertainty for 
sovereign debt markets.  However, in recognizing NML’s extraordinary and 
fact-driven nature, the Second Circuit provided ample grounds for other 
courts to distinguish NML in future cases.  Therefore, until broader 
solutions for sovereign debt problems are implemented, other courts should 
apply NML as narrowly as possible.   
 
A. The Problem of Rogue Precedent 
 
Opposition to the NML court’s interpretation of pari passu by the likes 
 
 220  The court was well aware of the likelihood that Argentina would continue to defy its orders.  See, 
e.g., Transcript of Hearing at 15, NML v. Argentina, Nos. 08-CV-6978 and 09-CV-1708 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 9, 2012). 
 221  Id. at 2. 
 222  See Porzecanski, supra note 29; see also Fisch & Gentile, supra note 59. 
 223  See Gelpern, Building, supra note 84, at 1133 (“Even industry associations went on record to say 
that rogue courts are a bigger danger to emerging market debt than rogue creditors.”) (citing EMTA, 
POSITION REGARDING THE QUEST FOR MORE ORDERLY SOVEREIGN WORK-OUTS (2002), available at 
http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/keymsg1.pdf). 
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of the United States, France, and the IMF speaks volumes.224  For their part, 
the United States and the IMF have serious reservations about Argentina’s 
approach to international obligations since the 2001 default.225  Argentina 
and the IMF have also been at odds over official statistics.226  Among other 
debts and unsettled disputes, Argentina owed billions to the Paris Club.227  
France, a key member of the Paris Club, overcame its concerns with 
Argentina’s approach to international obligations in formally opposing 
NML.228  Brazil and Mexico also raised concerns in separate amicus briefs 
filed with the Supreme Court.229  In light of these concerns, it is remarkable 
that all these parties are united—in certain terms and highly visible 
fashion—against the NML approach to pari passu and injunctive remedies. 
A primary concern among these parties is the impact of NML 
precedent on the orderly restructuring of sovereign debt.230  Threats to 
restructuring have serious adverse consequences not just for sovereign 
debtors, but also for exchange creditors who participate in restructurings.231  
Granting holdouts broad rights to recover in full undermines the fair sharing 
of burden among sovereign creditors and the sovereign in distress.  At the 
 
 224  For U.S. views, see supra note 22.  For French views, see Brief for the Republic of France as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Republic of Argentina’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2–3, Republic 
of Argentina v. NML Capital Ltd., No. 12-1494 (July 26, 2013).  For the IMF’s views, see IMF, 
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING—RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S 
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK (2013), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/ 
2013/042613.pdf. 
 225  See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 1 (While the 
United States does not condone Argentina’s actions in the international financial arena, Argentina’s 
petition for rehearing en banc presents a “question of exceptional importance”); see also Joseph 
Cotterill, The IMF Won’t be Argentina’s Pari Passu Frenemy. Why?, FIN. TIMES ALPHAVILLE BLOG 
(July 24, 2013, 4:17 AM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/ 2013/07/24/1579752/. 
 226  See Jude Webber, IMF Acts Over Flawed Argentine Economic Data, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2013, 
11:15 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eb704c98-6cbe-11e2-953f-00144feab49a.html?siteedition= 
intl#axzz2sD6MLLgr. 
 227  See Jude Webber, Argentina’s Debt: Quantified, FIN. TIMES BEYONDBRICS BLOG (Oct. 4, 2011, 
10:43 PM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/10/04/argentina-much-more-indebted-that-you-think 
/#axzz2sCuR8Wva; see also Pablo Gonzalez, Argentina Submits Offer to Paris Club for $10 Billion 
Debt, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-20/argentina-sees-
agreement-on-10-billion-debt-with-paris-club.html. 
 228  See Anna Gelpern, France is Man Enough to Pari Passu, CREDIT SLIPS (Jul. 27, 2013, 7:59 
AM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/07/france-is-man-enough-to-pari-passu.html (“Like 
the United States and the IMF, the Paris Club is mad-mad-mad at Argentina for failing to repay billions 
of dollars, but France is evidently more worried about the impact of the Second Circuit decision on debt 
restructuring and the rest of the Paris Club business”). 
 229  See Anthony Harrup & Shane Romig, Mexico Backs Argentina in Dispute with Bond Holdouts, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023046881 
04579463771537655770. 
 230  See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 4–5; see also 
Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae, supra note 224, at 10–17. 
 231  See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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same time, this approach reduces incentives for participation in 
restructuring and creates serious uncertainties for financial market service 
providers. 
The Second Circuit brushed these concerns aside rather summarily, 
concluding that the collective action clauses (CACs) will prevent holdout 
situations like this in the future.232  Unfortunately, the court’s position 
depends on an overly optimistic view of the ability of CACs to resolve 
holdout issues in the future.  CACs were introduced to sovereign bonds 
governed by New York law with Mexico’s adoption of a CAC in a 2003 
bond issuance.233  CACs limit the ability of a minority of bondholders to 
derail a restructuring by allowing a majority—usually 75%—of 
bondholders to make restructuring decisions across an entire issuance.234  
Properly drafted, CACs offer a significant improvement over unanimity 
action clauses, especially for bonds with atomized holders.  In theory, 
CACs alleviate coordination and collective action problems common in 
sovereign debt restructurings.235   
However, prevailing practices tell a different story than the Second 
Circuit’s understanding of the CAC solution.  For one, many outstanding 
sovereign bonds simply do not have CACs.236  Another problem is that 
many CACs bind only bondholders within a particular issuance.  
Sovereigns often have multiple issuances.  An outside investor could buy in 
at just over 25%—conceivably, at a relatively modest price—of just one 
issuance to block a restructuring.  Indeed, holdout creditors recently 
blocked Greece’s restructuring of a substantial chunk of debt in spite of 
CACs.237  Aggregation clauses mitigate the cross-issuance problems to an 
extent, but they are not yet in wide use.238  Contrary to the Second Circuit’s 
understanding, contractual drafting in sovereign bonds has not yet evolved 




 232  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 247–48 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2013). 
 233  Id. at 248. 
 234  There are two primary categories of CACs.  Modification clauses allow a predefined majority of 
holders in a series of bonds to bind other holders in that series to an agreement to restructure the entire 
series.  Acceleration clauses prevent individual bondholders from demanding full payment upon default 
by requiring a bondholder vote to approve the demand.  See W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, A 
People’s History of Collective Action Clauses, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 51, 53 (2013). 
 235  Id. 
 236  See Declaration of Stephen Choi at 26, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08-CV-
6978 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2012) (noting that “65 or 25.3% of New York law governed bond issuances 
with a maturity date of 2013 or later employ a [unanimity action clauses] for changes to payment related 
terms”). 
 237  See IMF, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING, supra note 224, at 28. 
 238  See Declaration of Stephen Choi, supra note 236, at 10. 
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B. Drastic Measures are Undesirable 
 
Drastic measures like the injunctive remedies in NML offer a tempting 
fix for unenforceability.  Courts are understandably reluctant to appear 
hapless when dealing with a “recalcitrant” sovereign.  But injunctive 
remedies overcorrect for unenforceability and shift burdens to third parties.  
Though satisfying in some respects, the costs outweigh the benefits.  
Furthermore, drastic overcorrections threaten to disrupt the broader 
sovereign debt system, creating undesirable costs for various nonrogue 
actors in the market.   
The dysfunctionality of the sovereign debt system is exaggerated by a 
small handful of high profile restructuring failures, namely Peru and 
Argentina.  Unfortunately, it is precisely these outlier situations that have 
led to rogue precedent on sovereign debt, namely Elliott and NML.  The 
vast majority of sovereign debt restructurings proceed in orderly fashion.  
Even though sovereign debt litigation is on the rise, few defaults trigger a 
wave of lawsuits.239  Between 1976 and 2013, just twenty-nine of 176 
restructurings were followed by litigation.240  And only Argentina’s 
restructuring resulted in persistent holdout litigation.  Those that do trigger 
waves of litigation—again, Argentina and Peru—account for the lion’s 
share of total volumes.241   
In addition to low rates of incidence, the weight of claims also remains 
relatively low.  IMF economist Manmohan Singh once suggested that 
vultures might be more aptly named “mosquitos,” based on their actual 
import.242  Though pesky and irritating, amounts litigated are relatively 
small compared to the total amounts restructured.  In a sample of 108 cases, 
the amounts litigated averaged 3.6% of total the amounts restructured with 
a median of just 1.7%.243  Even the record-smashing litigation against 
Argentina represents just 4.5% of the original amount of Argentina’s 2001 
default, though this number could increase significantly as non-NML 
plaintiff holdouts come forward.244   
To be sure, the existing regime—or lack thereof—for sovereign debt is 
an imperfect system.  Governing the sovereign ungovernable is a difficult 
task for courts.  But, even as incomplete as the existing system is, it works 
most of the time.  For all their righteous indignation about sanctity of 
contract and creditors rights, sovereign debt holdouts may not be as 
 
 239  See Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 11 (Observing that “runs” on the courthouse only 
happened in two situations: Argentina and Peru). 
 240  Id. 
 241  Id. 
 242  A Victory by Default?, supra note 71. 
 243  Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 12. 
 244  See Russo & Porzecanski, supra note 19. 
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victimized as they would like to appear.  On average, sovereign debt 
haircuts are much less drastic than corporate loan and debt restructurings—
despite the vast leverage supposedly possessed by sovereigns.245  In the 
United States, debtor-friendly provisions in bankruptcy law often leave 
unpaid creditors or pension haircuts for workers in the wake of 
insolvency.246  Less sympathetic is indignation among hedge funds that buy 
in at heavily discounted prices to gamble for full recovery through judicial 
relief. 
While the need for a sovereign debt insolvency mechanism is clear, 
potential solutions remain highly incomplete.247  Unfortunately, a recent 
spasm of case law relying on strained—if not simply mistaken—readings of 
pari passu combined with supercharged injunctive remedies threatens 
further aggravation of an already imperfect system.  In addition to 
overinflating incentives to holdout, NML also weakens incentives for 
participation in sovereign debt exchanges.  Rogue precedent creates serious 
uncertainty for sovereigns, their creditors, and even third parties in the 
financial system such as trustees, clearing houses, and payments systems.248   
 
C. Applying NML Narrowly 
 
In light of NML’s outlier facts across the various stages of sovereign 
debt—as a debtor, as a sovereign in crisis, as a negotiating sovereign in 
default, and as a defendant—there are ample grounds to consider the NML 
precedent narrowly.  NML is an unsuitable point of departure for creating 
highly disruptive precedent in a critical area of law for sovereign debt.  
Amplifying the gravity of the NML precedent, a majority of emerging 
market sovereign bonds issued internationally are subject to New York law 
and most sovereign debt litigation is brought in the Southern District of 
New York.249  Further, many outstanding sovereign bonds contain pari 
passu clauses like Argentina’s.  Sovereign bonds are frequently long-term 
instruments with maturities measured in decades.  Unfortunately, 
contractual innovations like CACs lag behind contemporary problems in 
sovereign debt.250   
 
 245  See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 246  Chris Christoff, Detroit Manager Outlines Pension-Cut Plans for Workers, BLOOMBERG (June 21, 
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-20/detroit-manager-orders-probe-of-benefit-programs-1-
.html (discussing reactions to haircuts for workers and bondholders in Detroit’s restructuring); Detroit 
Creditors Brace for Haircuts, or Worse, at Meeting to Avoid Bankruptcy, REUTERS (June 14, 2013, 12:00 
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/14/usa-detroit-creditors-idUSL2N0EN20520130614  
(highlighting the leverage of a debtor heading towards Chapter 9 bankruptcy vis-á-vis creditors). 
 247  See Gelpern, Quasi-Sovereign, supra note 83; Gelpern, Bankruptcy, supra note 83. 
 248  See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 249  See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 250  See supra notes 57, 224, 234, 236 and accompanying text. 
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In its August 23, 2012 opinion, the Second Circuit wisely recognized 
the uncomfortable reality facing the court.  The opinion recognized the 
extraordinary and fact-driven nature of NML—distancing the decision from 
potentially disruptive and awkward precedent:  
 
But this case is an exceptional one with little apparent bearing on 
transactions that can be expected in the future.  Our decision here 
does not control the interpretation of all pari passu clauses or the 
obligations of other sovereign debtors under pari passu clauses in 
other debt instruments.  As we explicitly stated in our last 
opinion, we have not held that a sovereign debtor breaches its 
pari passu clause every time it pays one creditor and not another, 
or even every time it enacts a law disparately affecting a 
creditor’s rights.  We simply affirm the district court’s conclusion 
that Argentina’s extraordinary behavior was a violation of the 
particular pari passu clause found in the FAA.251 
 
In recognizing the extraordinary nature of NML, the Second Circuit 
provided grounds to apply the NML precedent narrowly.  Other courts 
should consider this message from the Second Circuit as a starting point for 
distinguishing NML from future sovereign debt cases.  Though a holding 
based on a decisive interpretation of pari passu would have supplied more 
clarity, the Second Circuit’s language at least provides grounds for 
mitigating the NML precedent until more permanent solutions for sovereign 
insolvency emerge.   
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Although the Second Circuit partially recognized the “exceptional” 
circumstances of this case, the NML situation is exceptional across all 
phases of sovereign debt.  Faced with bad facts, NML has already created 
bad law.  But other courts can mitigate the fallout by distinguishing this 
case from others until broader sovereign debt solutions are available.  There 
are ample and compelling grounds to apply NML narrowly.  Cases like 
Elliott and NML underscore the dangerous temptation facing courts to 
overcorrect for unenforceability in sovereign debt litigation.  Until 
contractual innovations or institutional solutions catch up with the rogue 
trends in sovereign debt, it is likely these temptations will persist.252 
 
 251  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 247 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2012). 
 252  Contractual solutions set forth by the International Capital Market Association, including a modified pari 
passu clause and more robust aggregated CACs are a good starting point.  See  Sovereign Debt Information, INT’L 
CAP. MKT. ASS’N, http://www.icmagroup.org/resources/Sovereign-Debt-Information/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
 
